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Abstract 
It is well understood that corruption can change the incentives to engage in political violence. However, 
the scope for corruption to change attitudes towards the permissibility of violence has received less 
attention. Drawing on Moral Foundations Theory, we argue that experiences of corruption in the social 
environment are likely to shape individual attitudes towards violent behavior. Using data from the 
Afrobarometer, we document a statistically significant and sizable relationship between an individual’s 
experience of paying bribes and their attitudes to political, interpersonal, and domestic violence. These 
relationships are evident for both men and women and, with the exception of women’s attitudes to 
domestic violence, are robust to the inclusion of variables capturing the local incidence of corruption, 
local norms regarding violence, and a proxy for the local incidence of violence with the community. 
We find that corruption is associated with permissive attitudes to violence even after controlling for the 
perceived legitimacy of the police and courts.  
Keywords:  Corruption; Bribery; Violence; Political Violence; Revenge; Domestic Violence; sub-
Saharan Africa 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Corruption, commonly defined as the abuse of public power for private gain, can change the incentives 
that people face in relation to revolutionary activity and violence by lowering the costs and increasing 
the benefits. In a corrupt society, control over the levers of the economy can be lucrative.  O’Day (2001) 
argues that corruption within the Mexican army has facilitated the country’s drugs trade. The finding 
of De Luca et al (2018) that the homelands of political leaders tend to benefit economically 
demonstrates that political control confers benefits to ruling ethnic groups. Similarly, Pierskalla and 
Sacks (2017) argue that in Indonesia conflicts arose following decentralisation as groups fought for 
control of public services. Baev (2018) points to corrupt elite competition for control of resources as 
being a key driver of Georgia’s post USSR armed conflicts. This argument aligns well with the finding 
of Berman et al (2017) that less corrupt countries are less prone to natural resource induced violence. 
Tollefsen (2017) similarly finds that poverty is particularly associated with conflict in regions with poor 
governance. Corruption also changes the trade-offs faced by potential revolutionaries by undermining 
economic growth (Mauro, 1995) and fostering poverty and inequality (Gupta et al, 2002; Dincer and 
Gunalp, 2011). Corruption has also been shown to undermine subjective wellbeing in some contexts 
(Tavits, 2008; Welsch, 2008; Djankov et al, 2016; Gillanders, 2016). The Arab Spring revolutions of 
2011 can, in part, be traced to dissatisfaction with entrenched and pervasive corruption (Mansfield and 
Synder, 2012). Lindberg and Orjuela (2011) identify corruption as an obstacle to post war reconciliation 
and stability in Sri Lanka.  
This paper examines another mechanism through which corruption can foster violence. Using 
Afrobarometer data, we show that experiencing corruption is an economically and statistically 
significant predictor of attitudes to violence. People are more likely to view violence as justifiable if 
they have been exposed to corrupt public officials. The data also allows us to go beyond political 
violence, which, along with corruption enabled drugs violence, has been the focus of the extant 
literature. We show that attitudes to interpersonal violence and domestic violence are also significantly 
associated with exposure to corruption. This fact that corruption influences attitudes to violence beyond 
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the political domain suggests that this association is not a simple artefact of diminished state legitimacy 
or increased sense of grievance with government.  
These relationships exist for both men and women and, with the notable exception of female attitudes 
to domestic violence, they are robust to the inclusion of competing explanations which are plausibly 
correlated with one’s own likelihood paying a bribe and attitudes to violence. Specifically, one’s own 
corruption experience is still significant even when controlling for the local incidence of corruption, 
local violence norms, and a control for local violence. We also show that our results are robust to the 
inclusion of the perceived legitimacy of the courts and police. This suggests that our results are not 
simply capturing an effect of corruption on the willingness to comply with the law. 
To the extent that people incur disutility from carrying out acts that they view as hard to justify, our 
results can be viewed as evidence of a new mechanism linking corruption to violent outcomes via a 
reduction this psychological cost. Our findings, particularly those relating to domestic violence, also 
point to what is to the best of our knowledge a previously undocumented cost of corruption. Acts of 
petty corruption are associated with the briber payers being more likely to view acts of violence against 
others, including wives and children, as acceptable in some circumstances. This finding adds to the 
weight of evidence that the burden of corruption tends to fall most heavily on already vulnerable groups 
such as victims of crime (Hunt, 2007), and infants (Azfar and Gurgur, 2008).   
Social psychology offers insights into the behaviors and mechanisms that can explain this observed link 
between corruption experiences to attitudes to violence. Drawing on Moral Foundations Theory, we 
present an argument that experiences of corruption in the social environment help to shape the moral 
foundations on which individuals base their attitudes and behavior. Specifically, we propose that 
corruption impacts the development of moral principles related to submission to authority, care and 
protection of others, attitudes towards abhorrent behavior or action and the coercion of less dominant 
individuals.  In turn these foundations provide a basis from which individual attitudes towards political, 
domestic and interpersonal violence develop.  
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The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 further discusses the mechanisms through 
which corruption can plausibly influence attitudes to violence. Section 3 describes our data and 
approach, the results of which are presented in Section 4. We conclude in Section 5 and discuss the 
implications of our results for policy. 
2. THEORY  
Violence can be defined as behaviour that involves the use of physical force against oneself or another 
causing significant harm, injury or death (Ferguson, 2010). Although violence exists in many forms, 
our interest in this paper is in understanding the correlates of political, interpersonal and domestic 
violence. Given the heavy costs and harm that is associated for unwilling victims with each of these 
forms of violence, they are typically viewed as an immoral behaviour (Bratton, 2008). It has become 
clear in the extant literature that individual and collective levels of violence cannot be explained by a 
combination of motivation and opportunity but that factors influencing perception and ideas of violence 
influence the subsequent development of these immoral attitudes and behaviour (Bhavnani & Backer, 
2007). We argue that permissive attitudes towards violence are likely to be related to factors which 
influence the development of morality perceptions. 
Morality refers to the social norms that guide behaviour whereby certain actions are prohibited and 
others prescribed (Yoder & Decety, 2018). Moral Foundations Theory (Haidt & Joseph, 2004; Haidt, 
2007; Haidt & Graham, 2007) proposes that moral perceptions and judgements are based on six key 
principles that humans are innately prepared to develop due to their alignment with recurrent social 
challenges (Haidt, 2012). These six moral principles or foundations are harm/care, fairness/reciprocity, 
ingroup/loyality, authority/respect, liberty/oppression and purity/sanctity. Of particular interest to our 
paper are the principles of authority and respect which relates to submission to tradition and the 
legitimacy of authority; sanctity and purity which relates to an objection to disgusting behaviour and 
degradation; care which relates to the protection of others and prevention of harm; and liberty which 
concerns the coercion or oppression of less powerful individuals.  
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Haidt and colleagues argue that although all humans are innately prepared to develop a moral position 
in relation to these principles, this position develops over time as a result of experiences of the social 
world (e.g. Haidt & Joseph, 2007). This idea of social environments and exposure as sharping morality 
is mirrored across many theories of moral development (Decety & Wheatley, 2015). The findings of 
Bucheli et al (2019) that return migrants reduce violence by injecting social capital into their 
communities can be interpreted in this light. 
Previous research has demonstrated repeatedly that experiences of corruption in the social environment 
are powerful in shaping attitudes and behaviour. Indeed, research suggests that levels of corruption are 
linked to violence in the context of natural resources (Berman et al., 2017). We build on this literature 
to propose that experiences of corruption in the social environment are likely to influence attitudes to 
violence by challenging the moral foundations outlined by MFT. 
In particular, the abuse of power inherent in the definition of corruption suggests that personal 
experiences of corruption are likely to undermine the authority foundation. Corruption is known to 
undermine the trust in, and the perceived legitimacy of, the state including politicians, officials, and the 
police (e.g. Seligson, 2002; Anderson & Tverdova, 2003; Chang & Chu, 2006; Armah‐Attoh, Gyimah‐
Boadi, & Chikwanha, 2007; Lavallée, Razafindrakoto, & Roubaud, Kääriäinen, 2008; Morris & 
Klesner, 2010; Blanco, 2013). The seminal study of Fisman and Miguel (2007) pointed to the 
importance of norms in determining corrupt behaviour and provided an observational counterpart to the 
experimental finding of Abbink et al. (2002) that the threat of punishment can have a significant 
deterrent effect. The experimental work of Boly et al. (2019) points to a legitimacy effect whereby 
deterrent policies enacted by a corrupt policymaker have no effect on the embezzlement behaviour of 
others. Importantly, Vecina and colleagues argue that a lack of deference to a legitimate authority is 
crucial in predicting violent behaviour (Vecina, Marzana & Paruzel-Czachura, 2015). This may be 
influenced partially by the process of moral disengagement that allows people to engage in immoral 
actions which is commonly influenced by a displacement of responsibility to authority figures who have 
explicitly or implicitly condoned that action (Moore, Detert, Trevino, Baker, & Mayer, 2012). In line 
with this, we hypothesize: 
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 H1- Experienced corruption is positively related to attitudes to political violence 
Although political violence has received considerable attention in the extant literature, our paper also 
aims to examine the correlates of domestic and interpersonal forms of violence. Domestic violence 
refers to violence specifically directed towards an intimate partner (McClennan, 2005). In contrast, 
interpersonal violence is a term used to describe violence directed at another individually more 
generally. In these more personal instances of violence, other moral foundations are likely to play a 
more central role. Experiences of corruption in the social environment which undermine perceptions of 
authority are also likely to impact beliefs about the responsibilities of dominant individuals to protect 
others (care foundation) and to avoid disgusting actions (purity foundation) or coercion of less dominant 
individuals (liberty foundation).  
Empirical research suggests that challenges to these foundations are likely to have important 
consequences for more personal forms of violence. For instance, the purity foundation which concerns 
beliefs about disgusting actions and degradation is closely linked with attitudes towards women and 
sexism (Sakalh-Ugurlu & Glick, 2003). Furthermore, Gage (2005) reports that need for control and 
coercion is related to experiences of domestic violence. This need for control is likely to be underpinned 
by the liberty/oppression moral foundation particularly given the patriarchal power differentials that 
characterise many domestic violence cases (McClennan, 2005). Accordingly, we hypothesise: 
H2 – Experienced corruption is positively related to attitudes to domestic violence 
While the consequences we have considered thus far have related to attitudes towards the behaviour of 
others, the Afrobarometer also allows us to examine the impact of corruption on attitudes towards our 
own interpersonal violent behaviour. Measures of revenge include a judgement about the extent to 
which it is acceptable to enact revenge in response to violent crime or whether one should go to the 
police. In this instance, moral foundations related to authority, purity and care are all likely to be 
important in influencing attitudes. Specifically, experiences of corruption and abuse of power will shape 
individual perceptions of the need to submit to authority, avoid abhorrent behaviour and protect others. 
Impact on the care/harm foundation of moral behaviour is in line with social capital perspectives which 
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suggest that corruption undermines people’s willingness to cooperate and make themselves vulnerable 
to others (Bhayani and Backer, 2007; Kelly et al., 2010). We expect the impact on these moral 
foundations will be associated with a more permissive attitude to interpersonal violence as a means of 
revenge and a decreased likelihood of turning to the authorities. In line with this, we hypothesise: 
H3 – Experienced corruption is positively related to attitudes to revenge 
3. DATA AND APPROACH 
Table 1 displays summary statistics for the variables used in our analysis and Table A1 in the appendix 
provides full definitions. We use data from the Afrobarometer, a series of representative household 
surveys of political attitudes and economic conditions. Our main focus is on Round 2 of the 
Afrobarometer which was conducted in 2002 and 2003 in 16 countries in sub-Saharan Africa. This 
round of the survey contains three variables which capture attitudes to violence in three distinct arenas 
– political, interpersonal, and domestic. 
[TABLE 1] 
Each of the three questions asks respondents to identify which statement they agree with from a pair 
capturing attitudes regarding the acceptability of violence in different contexts. Our measure of political 
violence, political, takes a value of 1 if the respondent agrees (or very strongly agrees) with the 
statement that “In this country, it is sometimes necessary to use violence in support of a just cause” and 
zero if the respondent agrees (or very strongly agrees) with the statement that “The use of violence is 
never justified in [their country’s] politics.” Similarly, revenge, takes a value of 1 if the respondent 
agrees (or very strongly agrees) with the statement that “If you were the victim of a violent crime, you 
would find a way to take revenge yourself” and zero if the respondent agrees (or very strongly agrees) 
with the statement that “If you were a victim of a violent crime, you would to the police for help.” 
Finally, domestic, takes a value of 1 if the respondent agrees (or very strongly agrees) with the statement 
that “A married man has a right to beat his wife and children if they misbehave.” and zero if the 
respondent agrees (or very strongly agrees) with the statement that “No-one has the right to use physical 
violence against anyone else.” 
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Table 1 shows that 22% of our sample hold the attitude that political violence is sometimes justifiable 
and that there is little difference between the attitudes of men (22%) and women (21%). Table 2 presents 
the correlation matrix for these three variables. Far fewer people (11%) express the view that taking 
revenge oneself is appropriate and once again there is little difference between the expressed attitudes 
of men (12%) and women (10%). However, the share of people who agree that there are circumstances 
in which a man can beat his wife and children is somewhat higher at 28%. There are also differences of 
opinion between male and female respondents with nearly a third of the former agreeing versus a quarter 
of the later. Domestic violence is the domain in which violence has the most acceptance – by men and 
women. It is possible that in some places, fear of revealing oneself to have committed a crime may lead 
people to hide their true views and so it will be important to control for unobserved country effects in 
our models. Local norms may also be important in this respect (and may also serve to change the mental 
cost of committing violence) and so we will control for the local average of each of these variables in 
robustness tests. We also cluster standard errors by local region. Table 2 presents the correlations 
between these three variables. These correlations are all rather low suggesting that people can and do 
hold different attitudes towards the acceptability of violence in different contexts, and that it makes 
sense to look at these as distinct outcomes.  
[TABLE 2] 
Our main explanatory variable of interest captures whether the respondent has had to pay a bribe to 
public officials in the past year. The Afrobarometer asks a series of questions of the form “In the past 
year, how often (if ever) have you had to pay a bribe, give a gift, or do a favour to government officials 
in order to ….” We create a dummy variable, bribe, which takes a value of one if the respondent reports 
having had to pay a bribe (with any frequency) in any of the following contexts; avoiding problems 
with the police; seeking to obtain documents or permits, a school placement, or a household service 
(such as piped water or electricity); or “anything else.3” bribe therefore captures a wide range of 
                                                          
3
 The surveys also ask about bribe experience in the context of crossing a border. Since this could entail paying a 
bribe to agents of another state, we do not include this information in our measure of bribery experience.  
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interactions between citizens and the state.4 Table 1 shows that 25% of our sample have experienced 
bribery in the past year. Men are more likely to experience this sort of corruption (29%) than women 
(22%). Much as in the case of attitudes to violence, in certain environments people may misrepresent 
their experiences for fear of exposure or being seen to break a norm. This is a valid concerns and so it 
is worth noting that the bribery information in the Afrobarometer has been used in a variety of studies 
(Bratton and Mattes, 2003; Nunn and Wantchekon, 2011; Ali et al., 2014; Justesen and Bjørnskov, 
2014; Knutsen and Kotsadam, 2020). Moreover, our inclusion of country fixed effects allows us to 
account for any systematic misreporting across countries. 
While our main focus is on experienced corruption, we also control for the individual’s perceptions of 
corruption. A perception of corruption could inform attitudes to violence independently of any actual 
experience and so we are interested in this relationship in its own right. By controlling for perceptions 
of corruption, which can differ from reality (Seligson, 2006; Gillanders and Parviainen, 2018), we can 
examine whether the experience predicts attitudes to violence over and above any effect of change in 
attitudes to the state’s rulers. The survey asks “How many of the following people do you think are 
involved in corruption, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say?” in relation to “The President 
and Officials in his Office”, “Elected leaders, such as parliamentarians or local councillors”, and 
“Government officials.” Each of the questions can be answered “none”, “some of them”, “most of them” 
and “all” to which we assign the values from 0 to 3 respectively. Our measure of perceptions of 
corruption, perceptions, therefore takes values between 0-9 with larger numbers indicating a more 
pronounced sense that corruption is common in the country’s leadership.  
The final key control variable, history, is included to capture the respondent’s history of violence within 
the family. Simon et al (2001) find in their data from, the United States that recent victims of violence 
are more likely to display attitudinal acceptance of intimate partner violence. Moreover, people who 
have been exposed to violence within their family may be both more accepting of violence as a solution 
                                                          
4
 It is worth noting that it is not only the context of police corruption that drives our results. If we estimate our 
baseline models and include each context one at a time, we find that all are associated with attitudes to political 
violence, all bar the “anything else” context are associated with attitudes to revenge, and the contexts of documents 
and permits, household services and “anything else” are associated with attitudes to domestic violence.  
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in general and more vulnerable to corruption.  The variable takes a value of one if the respondent 
answers “sometimes” “often” or “always” to the question “In your experience, how often do violent 
conflicts arise between people … [w]ithin your own family?” and zero if they answer “never” or 
“rarely.” Approximately one fifth of our sample can be categorised as having a history of violence 
according to this criterion.  
We estimate probit models in which the dependent variable is one of our three measures of attitudes 
towards violence. As noted above, we include country dummies and cluster the standard errors by 
groups defined by the survey respondent’s region. We control for age, gender, a dummy capturing an 
urban location, broad profession indicators, and an index of lived poverty that captures how often the 
respondent has had to go without food, water, medical care, electricity, fuel for cooking, and a cash 
income. Larger values of this last variable indicate greater levels of deprivation.  
We report the marginal effects obtained from these probit models and focus on the relationship between 
bribe and each of the violence variables. We lack a panel dimension that would allow us to control for 
individual fixed effects and it is conceivable that certain unobservable characteristics could lead to some 
people being both more likely to hold the view that violence is acceptable and being more likely to be 
asked for or willing to pay a bribe. Therefore, we refrain from making causal claims or statements. 
Given the immense social and personal costs of violence, we feel our results still offer valuable insights 
to policymakers and civil society actors. 
4. RESULTS 
4.1 Main Results  
Table 3 presents our main results. We begin in Column 1 by examining attitudes to political violence. 
People who have experienced bribery are 7% more likely to express the view that violence can be 
justified for political ends. For comparisons sake, women are 1% less likely to hold this view. 
Corruption perceptions are also a significant predictor, with every unit increase on our 0-9 perceptions 
index associated with a 1% increase in political. We can also see that history has a significant and 
sizable marginal effect on political. People with a history of violence in their families are 6% more 
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likely to accept the validity of political violence. The comparable sizes of the bribe and history marginal 
effects reinforces the conclusion that corruption experiences play a large role in shaping attitudes to 
political violence. 
[TABLE 3] 
The second column acts as a robustness check of this result by employing a dummy variable which 
equals one if the individual admits to having used violence or that they would do so if they had the 
chance and zero if they claim that they would never do this. Both corruption variables and history are 
significant predictors of this self-reported willingness to engage in violence. This finding that corruption 
influences peoples’ willingness to admit to engaging in violence for political ends adds weight to our 
conclusion that, on average, corruption experiences change people’s attitudes towards violence. An 
additional explanation for this particular result is that, as noted in Section 1 above, corruption may lower 
the expected cost or increase the expected benefit from engaging in violence.   
Column 3 finds a similar relationship for the variable capturing attitudes to revenge, though the 
estimated marginal effect of bribe is smaller at 0.03. Once again, perceptions, history, and gender are 
strong predictors of one’s attitude to violence with the results pointing towards both an experience of 
corruption and a perception of corruption increasing the likelihood that people will think it acceptable 
to take the law into their own hands.  
The final columns of Table 3 examine attitudes towards domestic violence. Column 4 finds that those 
who have paid a bribe are more likely to think it is acceptable for a man to beat his wife and children 
under certain circumstances. Also, a greater perception of corruption is associated with holding this 
view regarding domestic violence. Not surprisingly, women are significantly and substantially less 
likely to agree with the acceptability of violence. The final column includes an additional control 
variable, misogyny¸ which takes a value of one if the respondent agrees (or very strongly agrees) with 
the statement that “Women have always been subject to traditional laws and customs, and should 
remain so.” and zero if the respondent agrees (or very strongly agrees) with the statement that “In our 
country, women should have equal rights and receive the same treatment as men do.” Table 1 shows 
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that such views are common in our sample with 33% of males and 24% of females agreeing with the 
first statement. Holding this view is associated with a 20% increase in the likelihood of viewing 
domestic violence as acceptable. However, our conclusions regarding corruption are not changed by 
the inclusion of this variable. 
Recall that (with the exception of Column 2) we are not looking at the incidence of violence which 
could be influenced by corruption changing the likelihood or severity of punishment. Rather we are 
looking at attitudes to violence. The results with respect to political and revenge can be understood in 
principle through the lens of disgust with the state and its agents. People who have been victims of 
malfeasance by state officials may view the state as less legitimate and its mechanisms for peaceful 
change as broken or rigged. Likewise, corruption may delegitimise law enforcement in the eyes bribe 
payers, leading them to view revenge actions as justifiable. These stories are less easy to tell when it 
comes to domestic. We interpret this to mean that corruption changes attitudes to violence over and 
above any change in attitudes regarding the legitimacy or efficacy of the state. We explore the 
legitimacy mechanism further below.  
In terms of the control variables, our lived poverty index is not a significant predictor of attitudes to 
violence. Nor is urban status except for the case of domestic which concludes that urban dwellers are 
less likely to view domestic violence as justifiable. More educated people are less likely to find domestic 
violence excusable though the pattern is less clear cut when it comes to poltical and revenge.  
Interestingly, while older people are less likely to view political violence or revenge as acceptable, older 
people are more likely to view domestic violence as justifiable. However when we control for misogyny, 
age is not a significant predictor of attitudes to domestic violence.   
4.2 Do Men and Women Respond Differently to Experiencing Corruption? 
We have established that there is a robust correlation between corruption experiences and perceptions 
and attitudes to violence. We have also seen that women are less likely to view violence as acceptable. 
Before examining some potential mechanisms for these results, we now ask if men and women may 
have different responses to experiencing corruption. Previous work on moral foundations theory suggest 
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that women are more concerned with moral foundations related to harm, fairness and purity (Graham 
et al., 2012). Furthermore, neuroscience suggests significant gender differences in moral sensitivity and 
appraisals and call for more exploration of gender differences in moral behaviours in a field setting 
(Harenski, Antonenko, Shane, & Kiehl, 2008). To investigate the possibility of gender differences in 
response to corruption, we split our sample by gender and estimate the baseline models from Table 3 
for each group. Table 4 presents the results of this exercise. 
[TABLE 4] 
bribe is a significant variable in each of our specifications. The estimated marginal effects are the same 
for men and women in the case of political and very similar for the other outcomes of interest, though 
in both of these later cases the estimated marginal effect for women is slightly smaller. Perceptions of 
corruption predict attitudes to political violence for men and women and to the same extent. However, 
for the other two domains of violence that we consider, perceptions is only significant in the male 
samples. This pattern repeats in terms of history. Age is also not a significant predictor of revenge or 
domestic for women. While the significance of some variables can vary by gender, the importance of 
corruption experiences is stable. We now proceed to examine some potential confounding factors and 
mechanisms for these results.  
4.3 Local Conditions and Norms 
A potential confounding factor is how corrupt the respondent’s locality is. Living in a corrupt area could 
influence both one’s own chances of being asked for a bribe and one’s willingness to do so. Table 5 
addresses this concern by including the local incidence of corruption as an additional control variable. 
This variable, meanbribe, is simply the average of bribe for all those in the same region as the 
respondent. While the regions in the survey need not correspond with actual administrative divisions, 
they do allow us to capture some information as to how prevalent bribery is in the respondent’s broad 
geographical region.  
[TABLE 5] 
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In terms of attitudes to political violence, while the local intensity of bribery is associated with a greater 
chance of holding the view that such acts can be justified, though only for men, our conclusions 
regarding the role of individual bribery experiences do not change (columns 1-3). Our results regarding 
the revenge outcome are also robust to the inclusion of meanbribe and in this case local corruption is 
not a significant predictor (columns 4-6).  However, the results regarding attitudes to domestic violence 
are somewhat different when we include meanbribe. Column 7 suggests that on average an experience 
of bribery fosters an acceptance of domestic violence, however when we split our sample by gender it 
appears that this is being driven by the male response. Column 8 finds that men’s attitudes to domestic 
violence are shaped by their own experiences and not by the local corruption environment. However, 
Column 9 suggests that for women, their own experiences do not predict domestic once meanbribe is 
allowed to enter the specification.  
We next examine the role of local norms regarding the acceptability of violence. People living in areas 
in which attitudes to violence are more permissive may face a lower barrier or mental cost to holding 
and expressing such views themselves. Corruption could also change the local norms over time and so 
it is important to see if individual corruption experiences correlate with violence attitudes holding local 
norms constant.  To this end, we average each of our outcome variables over the respondent’s region. 
This results in three variables, politicalnorm, revengenorm, and, domesticnorm¸ which capture the share 
of people in the respondent’s region who express the view that political violence, revenge, and domestic 
violence are acceptable. Table 6 shows that while local norms are a significant and strong predictor of 
individual attitudes, our results are for the most part robust to this exercise. Individual experiences of 
corruption are a statistically significant predictor of each of our outcomes except in the case of women’s 
attitudes to domestic violence (column 9).  We also observe that the link between women’s attitudes to 
revenge and experience of corruption is only significant at the 10% level.  
[TABLE 6] 
The final local variable we consider is the extent of violence in the community. As noted above, 
corruption could lead to increased conflict and this in turn could influence attitudes to violence. To rule 
out this mechanism as being the driver of our results showing a correlation between one’s experience 
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of corruption and attitude to violence, we include a variable, violentcommunity, which captures the share 
of people in the respondents region who express the view that violent conflicts arise between people 
within the community where they live “sometimes”, “often”, or “always.” This variable is a significant 
predictor of political for the overall sample and for both men and women (albeit at the 10% level in the 
case of the latter). However, it does not predict revenge for any of our samples and is only significantly 
correlated with domestic for women. In all of our models, bribe remains a statistically significant and 
meaningful correlate of attitudes to violence. 
[TABLE 7] 
If we include all of these local variables at the same time, we reach the same conclusions in that only 
in the case of the female sample for the domestic outcome is bribe statistically insignificant (results 
available on request). Given that the burden of domestic violence falls on women, it is not surprising 
that the way in which corruption influences female attitudes to domestic violence is different than it is 
for men. Our results suggest that women’s views of domestic violence are shaped more by local norms 
and conditions than by their own experiences of paying bribes.   
4.4 Legitimacy of Law Enforcement and Crime 
As noted above, several studies have pointed to the deleterious effect that corruption can have on trust 
in the state in general and on law enforcement institutions in particular. The perceived legitimacy of 
actors and institutions has also been shown to be important in terms of compliance with and efficacy of 
policy (Boly et al., 2019). Furthermore, Kirwin and Cho (2009) show that perceptions of state 
legitimacy predict attitudes to political violence using Afrobarometer data. To account for this potential 
effect of corruption on the perceived legitimacy of law enforcement, we generated variables reflecting 
respondent’s attitudes to the police and the courts. The first of these, policelegit, takes a value of one if 
the respondent agrees or strongly agrees with the statement that “The police always have the right to 
make people obey the law” and zero otherwise.  Similarly, courtslegit takes a value of one if the 
respondent agrees or strongly agrees with the statement that “The courts have the right to make 
decisions that people always have to abide by” and zero otherwise.  
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[TABLE 8] 
The first two columns of Table 8 demonstrate that these attitudes towards the police and courts are 
indeed shaped in part by one’s experiences of corruption with victims of corruption significantly and 
meaningfully less likely to view these institutions as legitimate. The local incidence of bribery, 
meanbribe, is not a significant predictor. We also control for the respondent’s history of experiencing 
other types of crime (being attacked or being the victim of theft) directly or in their family. This too 
strongly predicts holding negative views as to the legitimacy of the police and courts.  
These results reinforce the need to control for legitimacy in our analysis of the links between corruption 
experience and attitudes to violence as it may be the case that corruption operates on such attitudes 
through an effect on legitimacy. Moreover, Jackson et al (2013) find that attitudes to violence amongst 
young males in London are associated with the perceived legitimacy of the police. The remaining 
columns of Table 8 do find that perceived legitimacy informs attitudes to violence in the cases of 
political and revenge but bribe remains a meaningful and statistically significant predictor. Over and 
above the potential effect on legitimacy, corruption is a significant correlate of attitudes to violence. 
Being a victim, or at least party, to corruption is also different to being exposed to other criminal activity 
as we find little evidence that crime predicts attitudes to violence, though we do find an association with 
attitudes to political violence in line with Kirwin and Cho (2009).  
4.5 Robustness: Other Rounds of Afrobarometer 
Relationships in the social sciences need not be immutable “laws” for them to be of interest or of value. 
However, rounds three (2005-2006, 18 countries) and five (2011-2013, 34 countries) of the 
Afrobarometer allow us to examine whether our relationship of interest is evident in more recent data 
that also covers substantially more countries in the case of Round 5. Both of these later rounds contain 
questions that can be used to create an outcome variable that captures attitudes to political violence.5 
                                                          
5
 In round three the survey asks “Which of the following statements is closest to your view? A: The use of violence 
is never justified in [your country’s] politics. B: In this country, it is sometimes necessary to use violence in 
support of a just cause.” In round 5 the survey asks “Which of the following statements is closest to your view? 
Statement 1: The use of violence is never justified in [your country’s] politics today. Statement 2: In this country, 
it is sometimes necessary to use violence in support of a just cause.” In both cases respondents are asked to indicate 
their views on a scale. We use this information in the same way as we did when using the round 2 data.    
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Round 5 also asks a question that allows us to examine attitudes to revenge.6 While neither round has 
information that can be used to study attitudes to domestic violence and the contexts in which corruption 
is asked about can vary from round to round, Table 9 demonstrates that our conclusions regarding 
political and revenge are evident in these larger samples from later years. We conclude that the 
relationship between an experience of corruption and attitudes to violence is not an artefact of either the 
given time period or narrow set of countries covered in Round 2 of the Afrobarometer.  
[TABLE 9] 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
Using several rounds of representative household survey data for sub-Saharan African countries, this 
paper has shown that there is statistically significant and meaningful link between corruption and 
attitudes to political, interpersonal, and domestic violence. Those that have experienced petty corruption 
are more likely to view violence as justifiable. We find similar effects for both men and women. These 
findings are compatible with Moral Foundations Theory and are not an artefact of an ecological fallacy 
in which one’s own experience of corruption and attitudes to violence are determined by the local 
prevalence of corruption and violence or the prevailing norms regarding violence. Our central findings 
are also not simply reflecting an erosion of the perceived legitimacy enjoyed by law enforcement that 
arises in the face of corruption. 
Our results, particularly those relating to interpersonal and domestic violence, therefore point to a set 
of previously undocumented indirect costs of corruption. The later result fits well with several findings 
in the corruption literature that suggest that the burden of corruption tends to fall disproportionately on 
already vulnerable groups (Hunt, 2007; Azfar and Gurgur, 2008).  In terms of policy implications, by 
exposing new social and personal costs of corruption, our findings add further weight to the case for 
devoting substantial resources to anti-corruption efforts. Governmental and non-governmental agencies 
wishing to curb domestic violence may have common cause with anti-corruption advocates and 
                                                          
6
 The survey asks “If you were a victim of crime in this country, who, if anyone, would you go to first for 
assistance?” We consider those who answer they “would personally take revenge” or “would join with others to 
take revenge” to hold the view that revenge is acceptable. 
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practitioners. Our findings also fit with the studies that have found that victims of petty corruption are 
more likely to report anxiety (Gillanders, 2016) and lower levels of well-being (Sulemana et al., 2017). 
Taken together, the literature points to a clear conclusion: corruption can damage lives in a variety of 
ways that go beyond the direct economic consequences.  
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
  Full Sample Males Females 
  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
          
political 14498 0.22 0.41 7607 0.22 0.42 6891 0.21 0.41 
revenge 14699 0.11 0.31 7704 0.12 0.32 6995 0.10 0.30 
domestic 14871 0.28 0.45 7770 0.31 0.46 7101 0.25 0.43 
bribe 15196 0.25 0.43 7937 0.29 0.45 7259 0.22 0.41 
perceptions 15196 3.73 2.24 7937 3.79 2.25 7259 3.67 2.22 
history 15196 0.21 0.41 7937 0.21 0.41 7259 0.22 0.41 
age 15196 35.36 14.06 7937 36.84 14.76 7259 33.75 13.07 
female 15196 0.48 0.50 
      
Poverty Index (0-24 Scale) 15196 8.40 5.24 7937 8.42 5.25 7259 8.38 5.22 
urban 15196 0.39 0.49 7937 0.38 0.49 7259 0.40 0.49 
misogyny 14879 0.29 0.45 7762 0.33 0.47 7117 0.24 0.43 
 
 
Table 2: Correlation between Attitudes to Violence in Different Contexts (N= 13,894) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
political  revenge domestic 
political 1 
  
revenge 0.2188 1 
 
domestic 0.0777 0.0923 1 
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Table 3: Main Results 
Notes: Probit marginal effects reported. The corresponding standard errors are clustered by region 
and reported in parentheses.*, **, and *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
political  usedviol revenge domestic domestic 
      
bribe 0.07*** 0.05*** 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.03*** 
 (0.012) (0.011) (0.009) (0.012) (0.011) 
perceptions 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01** 0.01*** 0.01** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
history 0.06*** 0.04*** 0.02** 0.03** 0.03** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.009) (0.013) (0.013) 
misogyny     0.20*** 
     (0.014) 
age -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00** 0.00** 0.00 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
female -0.01* -0.03*** -0.02*** -0.07*** -0.05*** 
 (0.008) (0.005) (0.006) (0.010) (0.009) 
Did Not Complete Primary 
School 
Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref 
Primary or Some Secondary 0.00 0.02** -0.01* -0.05*** -0.03*** 
 (0.013) (0.010) (0.007) (0.011) (0.012) 
Secondary -0.01 0.01 -0.02* -0.09*** -0.06*** 
 (0.018) (0.013) (0.010) (0.017) (0.018) 
Post-Secondary Qualification -0.02 0.02 -0.03*** -0.14*** -0.11*** 
 (0.015) (0.018) (0.009) (0.017) (0.018) 
University and Postgraduate -0.02 0.08** 0.00 -0.17*** -0.14*** 
 (0.027) (0.033) (0.019) (0.017) (0.019) 
Poverty Index (0-24 Scale) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
urban -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.05*** -0.05*** 
 (0.010) (0.012) (0.008) (0.014) (0.014) 
Profession Dummies YES YES YES YES YES 
Country Dummies YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 14,498 15,034 14,699 14,871 14,609 
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Table 4: Sample Splits by Gender 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Sample: Males Females Males Females Males Females 
 political political revenge revenge domestic domestic 
       
bribe 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.03*** 0.02** 0.04*** 0.03** 
 (0.013) (0.015) (0.010) (0.011) (0.015) (0.015) 
perceptions 0.01*** 0.01** 0.01** 0.00 0.01*** 0.00 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
history 0.05*** 0.08*** 0.02** 0.02 0.03* 0.02 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.011) (0.011) (0.017) (0.015) 
age -0.00*** -0.00** -0.00*** -0.00 0.00** 0.00 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Did Not Complete Primary 
School 
Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref 
Primary or Some Secondary 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02** -0.07*** -0.04** 
 (0.014) (0.019) (0.009) (0.008) (0.016) (0.015) 
Secondary -0.02 -0.00 -0.02 -0.01 -0.10*** -0.07*** 
 (0.019) (0.024) (0.012) (0.012) (0.021) (0.018) 
Post-Secondary Qualification -0.03 -0.02 -0.02* -0.03** -0.15*** -0.13*** 
 (0.018) (0.021) (0.013) (0.012) (0.019) (0.021) 
University and Postgraduate -0.05* 0.02 -0.04*** 0.06* -0.20*** -0.14*** 
 (0.032) (0.037) (0.015) (0.035) (0.018) (0.023) 
Poverty Index (0-24 Scale) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00* 0.00 0.00 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
urban -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03* -0.06*** 
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.010) (0.010) (0.015) (0.018) 
Profession Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 7,607 6,891 7,704 6,995 7,770 7,101 
Notes: Probit marginal effects reported. The corresponding standard errors are clustered by region 
and reported in parentheses.*, **, and *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
respectively. 
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Table 5: Own Experience versus Local Bribery Incidence 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Sample: Full Males Females Full Males Females Full Males Females 
 political political political revenge revenge revenge domestic domestic domestic 
          
bribe 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.07*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.02** 0.03*** 0.04** 0.02 
 (0.011) (0.013) (0.015) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.015) (0.014) 
perceptions 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01* 0.01** 0.01** 0.00 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.00 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
history 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.08*** 0.02** 0.02** 0.02* 0.03* 0.03* 0.02 
 (0.011) (0.014) (0.014) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.014) (0.017) (0.016) 
meanbribe 0.17* 0.25** 0.08 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.24** 0.17 0.32*** 
 (0.097) (0.103) (0.102) (0.063) (0.074) (0.058) (0.117) (0.134) (0.113) 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Profession Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 14,498 7,607 6,891 14,699 7,704 6,995 14,871 7,770 7,101 
Notes: Probit marginal effects reported. The corresponding standard errors are clustered by region 
and reported in parentheses.*, **, and *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
respectively. All models include controls for age, education, poverty, and urban status. Full sample 
models also control for gender. 
 
Table 6: Local Norms  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Sample: Full Males Females Full Males Females Full Males Females 
 political political political revenge revenge revenge domestic domestic domestic 
          
bribe 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.02*** 0.03*** 0.02* 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.02 
 (0.011) (0.013) (0.015) (0.008) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.014) (0.014) 
perceptions 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01 0.00* 0.01** 0.00 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.00 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
history 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.07*** 0.02** 0.02* 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 
 (0.010) (0.013) (0.013) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.014) (0.017) (0.016) 
politicalnorm 0.97*** 0.97*** 0.97***       
 (0.035) (0.043) (0.057)       
revengenorm    0.70*** 0.75*** 0.65***    
    (0.032) (0.056) (0.035)    
domesticnorm       0.87*** 0.89*** 0.83*** 
       (0.027) (0.048) (0.038) 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Profession Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 14,498 7,607 6,891 14,699 7,704 6,995 14,871 7,770 7,101 
Notes: Probit marginal effects reported. The corresponding standard errors are clustered by region 
and reported in parentheses.*, **, and *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
respectively. All models include controls for age, gender, education, poverty, and urban status. Full 
sample models also control for gender. 
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Table 7: Violence within Community  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Sample: Full Males Females Full Males Females Full Males Females 
 political political political revenge revenge revenge domestic domestic domestic 
          
bribe 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.02** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.03* 
 (0.011) (0.013) (0.015) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.012) (0.015) (0.015) 
perceptions 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01** 0.01** 0.01** 0.00 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.00 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
history 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.07*** 0.02** 0.02** 0.02 0.02* 0.03* 0.02 
 (0.011) (0.014) (0.014) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.014) (0.017) (0.016) 
violentcommunity 0.13** 0.15** 0.11* 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.10 0.03 0.18** 
 (0.066) (0.073) (0.066) (0.039) (0.049) (0.039) (0.063) (0.069) (0.070) 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Profession Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 14,498 7,607 6,891 14,699 7,704 6,995 14,871 7,770 7,101 
Notes: Probit marginal effects reported. The corresponding standard errors are clustered by region 
and reported in parentheses.*, **, and *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
respectively. All models include controls for age, gender, education, poverty, and urban status. Full 
sample models also control for gender. 
 
 
Table 8: Legitimacy and Crime 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 policelegit courtslegit political revenge domestic political revenge domestic 
         
bribe -0.05*** -0.03*** 0.07*** 0.02** 0.04*** 0.07*** 0.02** 0.04*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.009) (0.012) (0.012) (0.009) (0.012) 
perceptions -0.02*** -0.01*** 0.01*** 0.00* 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.00* 0.01*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
history -0.01 -0.01 0.06*** 0.02** 0.03** 0.06*** 0.02** 0.03** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009) (0.013) (0.012) (0.009) (0.013) 
crime -0.02** -0.03*** 0.02* 0.01 0.01 0.02* 0.01 0.01 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009) 
meanbribe -0.02 -0.03       
 (0.093) (0.091)       
policelegit   -0.03** -0.06*** 0.01    
   (0.011) (0.008) (0.011)    
courtslegit      -0.02* -0.04*** 0.00 
      (0.011) (0.008) (0.011) 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Profession Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 15,033 14,870 14,354 14,548 14,715 14,213 14,396 14,555 
Notes: Probit marginal effects reported. The corresponding standard errors are clustered by region 
and reported in parentheses.*, **, and *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
respectively. All models include controls for age, gender, education, poverty, and urban status. 
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Table 9: Robustness – Later Rounds of Data 
Notes: Probit marginal effects reported. The corresponding standard errors are clustered by region 
and reported in parentheses.*, **, and *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Round: Three Three Three Five Five Five Five Five Five 
Sample: Full Males Females Full Males Females Full Males Females 
 political political political political political political revenge revenge revenge 
          
bribe 0.081*** 0.072*** 0.090*** 0.046*** 0.043*** 0.051*** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003* 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
perceptions 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.005*** 0.008*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
age -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
female -0.013**   -0.011**   -0.006***   
 (0.006)   (0.005)   (0.001)   
Did Not Complete Primary 
School 
Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref 
Primary or Some  Secondary -0.010 -0.025** 0.003 0.013** 0.021** 0.006 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 
 (0.008) (0.012) (0.012) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Secondary -0.013 -0.027 0.002 0.003 -0.002 0.011 0.002 0.001 0.003 
 (0.012) (0.017) (0.015) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
Post-Secondary Qualification -0.027** -0.035** -0.019 0.013 0.015 0.011 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.012) (0.016) (0.016) (0.011) (0.013) (0.015) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
University and  Postgraduate -0.041** -0.064*** -0.006 -0.001 -0.009 0.014 0.000 -0.000 0.002 
 (0.020) (0.023) (0.031) (0.013) (0.015) (0.020) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) 
Poverty Index  0.002 0.001 0.002* 0.002** 0.003*** 0.001 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
urban 0.006 0.010 0.002 -0.000 0.007 -0.008 0.000 0.002 -0.001 
 (0.009) (0.012) (0.012) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Profession Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 17,657 9,226 8,431 37,003 19,150 17,853 38,252 18,580 18,042 
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Appendix 
Table A1: Round 2 Data Variable Definitions  
Label Definition 
political 
Takes a value of 1 if the respondent agrees (or very strongly agrees) with 
the statement that “In this country, it is sometimes necessary to use 
violence in support of a just cause” and zero if the respondent agrees (or 
very strongly agrees) with the statement that “The use of violence is never 
justified in [their country’s] politics” 
revenge 
Takes a value of 1 if the respondent agrees (or very strongly agrees) with 
the statement that “If you were the victim of a violent crime, you would 
find a way to take revenge yourself” and zero if the respondent agrees (or 
very strongly agrees) with the statement that “If you were a victim of a 
violent crime, you would to the police for help.” 
domestic 
Takes a value of 1 if the respondent agrees (or very strongly agrees) with 
the statement that “A married man has a right to beat his wife and children 
if they misbehave.” and zero if the respondent agrees (or very strongly 
agrees) with the statement that “No-one has the right to use physical 
violence against anyone else.” 
usedviol 
Takes a value of one if the respondent says that he or she has “Used force 
or violence for a political cause” or would do so if he or she had the 
chance and zero the response is “No, would never do this” 
bribe 
Takes a value of 1 if the respondent reports having had to, in the past 
year, “pay a bribe, give a gift, or do a favour to government officials” in 
the context of avoiding problems with the police, getting a child into 
school,  getting a document or permit, getting a household service or for 
“anything else” 
meanbribe The average of bribe in the respondent’s region 
perceptions 
Created from questions which ask “How many of the following people 
do you think are involved in corruption, or haven’t you heard enough 
about them to say?” in relation to “The President and Officials in his 
Office”, “Elected leaders, such as parliamentarians or local councillors”, 
and “Government officials.” Each of the questions can be answered 
“none”, “some of them”, “most of them” and “all” to which we assign the 
values from 0 to 3 respectively leading to an index that takes values from 
0-9. 
history Takes a value of one if the respondent answers “sometimes” “often” or “always” to the question “In your experience, how often do violent 
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conflicts arise between people … [w]ithin your own family?” and zero if 
they answer “never” or “rarely.” 
misogyny 
Takes a value of one if the respondent agrees (or very strongly agrees) 
with the statement that “Women have always been subject to traditional 
laws and customs, and should remain so.” and zero if the respondent 
agrees (or very strongly agrees) with the statement that “In our country, 
women should have equal rights and receive the same treatment as men 
do.” 
politicalnorm The average of political in the respondent’s region 
revengenorm The average of revenge in the respondent’s region 
domesticnorm The average of domestic in the respondent’s region 
violentcommunity 
Captures the share of people in the individual’s region who answer that 
violent conflicts arise between people within the community where they 
live “sometimes”, “often”, or “always.” 
crime 
Takes a value of one if the respondent or anyone in their family has in the 
past year had something stolen from their home or been physically 
attacked and zero otherwise.  
policelegit 
Takes a value of one if the respondent agrees or strongly agrees with the 
statement that “The police always have the right to make people obey the 
law” and zero otherwise.   
courtslegit 
Takes a value of one if the respondent agrees or strongly agrees with the 
statement that “The courts have the right to make decisions that people 
always have to abide by” and zero otherwise.   
Poverty Index (0-
24 Scale) 
Sum  of  0-4  scale  questions which ask how often the respondent has 
had to go without food,  water,  medical  care,  electricity,  fuel  for  
cooking ,   and    cash    income.    Larger    numbers    indicate    more 
severe lived   poverty. 
urban Takes a value of 1 if the primary sampling unit was urban 
 
 
 
